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SCIENCE COLUMN:
RECONSTRUCTION: THE EXPERIMENTAL
SIDE OF DIGITAL FORENSICS
Fred Cohen
California Sciences Institute
California, USA
ABSTRACT
Many in digital forensics seem to forget that the science part of digital
forensics means experimentation and that implies a whole lot of things that
most practitioners never learned.
MOST CASES
Most cases don't seem to involve anything in the way of experimentation or
science. They involve bag and tag, transport, search, and present. Looking for
contraband content? No problem. If you know what you are looking for and it
is found, it is present. The reason it is seemingly so simple is that there is a
whole lot of research and development surrounding the searching process that
has been done for the last 50+ years. And if found, it's usually pretty easy to
verify that what was found was what you were looking for. Find a file,
compare the cryptographic checksum to a known item for a presumptive
positive, compare bit-for-bit to the original for a definitive answer, selectively
look at them with another tool just to make sure, and tell the court: “[This] is
what I did, [this] is what I saw.” But maybe that's just most of your cases... it's
almost none of mine.
MY CASES
Maybe I am unusual. I don't really know. I don't tend to take on cases where
there are 2 hours allowed for an answer. I tend to take on cases where there is a
period of months over which different issues come up. I tend to be in cases
where so-called experts say or write things that don't, to me, appear on their
face to be strictly true. And I tend to be in cases where I have to make sure
before I make a declaration. These cases almost always involve some
experimentation. Or as I call it–reconstruction.
Suppose someone claims that some e-mail was sent from some place because
an email header says so. My first reaction is to ask why they come to that
conclusion. What is the basis? And in most of the cases I have encountered,
they haven't told me the basis for their opinions in their reports. So I check it
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out. Suppose they mistakenly say something like “all [X] are [Y]”. That's
almost never true, so I check it out. And so should you.
CHECK IT OUT
“When in doubt, check it out.” If it isn’t already an official saying for digital
forensics, it should become one. Cite me on it. The lawyers prefer this, I think.
They seem to me to really want to know the truth. If it goes against them, they
want to know that so they can prepare for the contingency. And if it goes for
them, they want to know because it helps their case. In either case, it really
hurts if they think one thing and later find out something else.
To check it out, the first thing I usually do is try to repeat whatever the other
side did. It's not that I don't believe them. I just think it's your job to check out
the claims of the folks on the other side of the isle. If they say that Google
searches don't come up with the same result much of the time, even though my
experience agrees with them, I will still check it out. I just did. I did the
following search:
site:all.net supercalifragilisticexpialidocious
It came back with:
Your search–site:all.net supercalifragilisticexpialidocious - did
not match any documents.
Suppose you repeat it. See if your result differs. If not, we have just refuted by
experiment something that we may well have thought was true. I know, if you
do it in another language, it might come out differently, but if it means the
same thing then the result is equivalent (the meaningful part–none found–if
that is the thing we are trying to understand).
You think this is cheating? Because it's only true for searches returning no
results? Try looking for something else at all.net and see what happens. Try
disabling the advertising or ignoring it if it's not the relevant part of the issue.
So maybe I need to update my saying... “Always doubt, check it out.”
MOST EXPERIMENTS ARE PRETTY SIMPLE
I like to think that most of the most meaningful experiments in digital forensics
are really simple enough for the jury or judge to do on their own. If not, they
take a lot more explaining. I don't mind all that explaining, but I think it works
better when there is less of it and the judge and jury say to themselves “I get it”
as opposed to “Huh?”
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CAUSALITY AND REFUTATION BASICS
I have said and will likely say this often and again. Effect does not imply
cause. Rather cause (C) acting through mechanisms (m) produces effects (E),
expressed as C→mE. To have a scientific hypothesis, it is not enough to state
that C produces E, it is also necessary to identify the mechanism by which C
produces E. Testing can then be repeatedly done to confirm or refute the
hypothesis of C→mE by trying to refute the hypothesis. If refutation fails, it is a
confirmation, while if refutation succeeds, they hypothesis as stated cannot be
correct.
If that sounds like exactly what I said last time, it is. It continued:
While many confirmations may be found, any number of confirmations of a
universal statement do not prove it to be correct, while a single refutation
demonstrates its falsehood1. Typically, science progresses when a refutation is
identified, the errors in the C→mE hypothesis are identified, and an updated
C'→m'E version of the hypothesis is created to mitigate the refutation cases, or
the hypothesis abandoned.
When faced with a statement that is not couched in the proper specifics, always
try to refute it by experiment. Predict a cause and effect per the proposed claim.
Create a cause that meets the specifics of the claim, observe the effect, and see
if the prediction fails to match the expectation. Try edge cases, like my “no
result” search. Try center cases. Try the exact thing the other side tried, but
with unspecified conditions set in other ways. Try things! And report them all.
Don't just say I found this refutation. Say that you tried some cases that worked
out as predicted (if you find them).
To serve your client in a system based on an adversarial approach, you might
end up not testing exhaustively. The client may not support it because it has a
real financial cost. And you are not obligated to try to prove the case for the
other side. But on the other hand, sometimes you end up exhausting the space
and never coming up with a confirmation. But hopefully, when you are making
such statements, that won't happen... because...
TEST YOURSELF BEFORE YOU EXPRESS OPINIONS
Even when you know you are right, you should still perform tests to try to
refute your own claims. You could take the position that it has to be done
because I might end up on the other side and you don't want to look bad when I
come up with a counterexample. But a better reason is because it's the right
thing to do in a scientific field. But I admit that's not why I do it. I do it because

1

K. Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Hutchins and Company,
London. ISBN10: 0415278449.
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it's not enough to believe I am right, I need to prove it to myself experimentally
before I am willing to tell it to the judge and jury.
One of the areas I most often encounter in this regard is metadata. Before going
into more detail, I should point out that metadata as used in the computing field
differs from metadata as used in the archives and records management space.
Notably, this difference is not always made clear to the legal community which
is used to metadata associated with archives and public record-keeping systems
as the information that makes definitive the chain of custody and provenance
of such records, rending them accurate and reliable. This is not the case with
regard to metadata as it is used in the computing fields, where, for example, the
date and time stamp on a file can be readily changed by the user.
Regardless of its ready changeability in computer systems, the sort of metadata
associated with file and directory date and time stamps and ownership is
produced by automated mechanisms that are specific to particular operating
environments. Because they differ depending on a wide range of different
factors, claiming meaningful information about metadata without adequate
experimental basis is likely to be problematic if challenged. And it often yields
results that are not accurate, are less precise then claimed, and end up asserting
events in an order different from the reality of what took place.
In order to be more certain about such results, or in order to test the claims of
others, reconstruction is really the only available method. While the literature
on how date and time stamps are produced may indicate one thing or another,
there have been various experiments performed and results published that
indicate different results for the apparently same tests. These differences may
be due to patch variations or other environmental conditions, and thus testing
in situ is the optimal approach for getting the right answer.
PRECISION, ACCURACY, AND RELIABILITY
Precision has to do with the number of digits provided. For example, a time
stamp may indicate results to the nearest second, microsecond, millisecond, or
some other time span. But just because the indication is to this many digits of
precision doesn't mean the measurement itself is. A timestamp, in some cases,
is only recorded based on the date, ignoring the time. But the record may be in
a format including fields ranging to the millisecond. Or the routine that reads
the record may return results with fields that don't exist in the original data, set
to pre-defined default values. In examination and presentation, limiting the
precision of reporting is important to providing the trier of fact with the real
information presented without a false sense of precision. If the measurement is
to the nearest second, adding the millisecond fields is misleading. In comparing
two measurements recorded to different levels of precision, if they are too
close to each other, you cannot reliably indicate an ordering and should
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indicate that you cannot do so, presenting the ordering information so that the
multiple possible orderings are readily apparent.
Accuracy has a lot to do with whether the things being measured are properly
calibrated. For example, even though a measurement may be precise to the
nearest millisecond, it could be offset from another measurement by hours or
days. Even with network time protocol (NTP) working properly, variances of
milliseconds to seconds are not unusual. And it is not always working properly.
Sometimes, even though it is running, it is not connecting with remote servers.
And recent demonstrations show that NTP is attackable and forgeable, as is
global positioning system (GPS) data. Cellular phones use data from the
telephone network which can and often is offset by seconds from other time
sources. While the problem of accuracy has long been known and many folks
have tried to subvert forensics by changing system clocks, even without
malice, you have to be careful to get it right and report it properly.
Reliability is something entirely different. In the term of art of archives and
records management, it is the correspondence of the records to reality. This is
something that is very difficult in terms of the current state of the science.
Tying a computer record to reality involves a lot of indirection (hopefully not
misdirection).
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE RESCUE
Because of the nature of digital systems and the fact that effect doesn't imply
cause, looking at an audit trail indicating a login of a user identity at a time
from a terminal identifier is not adequate to tell us that someone logged in with
that user identity from that terminal at that time. But we can drive causality
forward by reconstructing the conditions on the system and doing tests of
various theories of the case, demonstrating that the tests came out consistent
with some set of theories of the case and inconsistent with another set of
theories of the case.
The question of what theories to test and to what level of certainty depends on
the nature of the case and the standard of proof. For example, in a patent case
for invalidity, an existence proof of prior art is all that is required. In such a
case, a single reconstruction of a system existing prior to the relevant dates in
the case that fulfills all of the elements of the patent may be perfectly adequate.
But in another case, such as an attribution case where there are many
possibilities of ways to bypass the normal authentication process, much more
may be required.
Attribution of computer-related acts in a criminal case where the defendant
claims they didn't undertake the relevant acts is an example of a far more
complex situation. It's hard to prove a negative (I didn't do it), but it is also
non-trivial to prove a positive beyond a reasonable doubt. For attribution,
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regardless of the issues outside of the computer, which must be addressed to
establish presence of the individual at the time and place asserted as used for
access, the acts of the individual as opposed to alternatives become a critical
issue, if challenged. Did someone else have access? If they did, could they
have yielded the same traces identified? Did the system actually work as
asserted? Was there a Trojan horse or other mechanism in place that altered the
normal operation?
Given the assumption that recent revelations regarding government access
programs for user and owner unauthorized access are true, this becomes more
than a theoretical issue. Once we start to realize that the technology for covert
unauthorized access has long been distributed and used on a large scale, the
question of proof of activities becomes harder to show. How do we know that
another actor did not commit the acts being denied by the suspect? If a Trojan
is in place and well hidden, how can we find it? If we find one, is that the only
one? If we are able to use it, can we produce the traces found? If we can
produce those traces, how do we show that nobody else in fact undertook acts
to produce the traces? The whole foundation of trust required to make
assertions about traces reflecting reality and causality come into question.
What we can do is reconstruct scenarios in which the actor did undertake the
act and seek to differentiate the alternatives from each other by examination of
increasingly details sets of traces. As we move through this process, if we find
that none of the traces we can reproduce meaningfully demonstrate the act, we
cannot assert the attribution of the act to the actor and in fact must both refute
those acts and confirm that something else we do not understand took place.
Any hypothetical that is consistent with the available traces is possible,
including system subversion by unknown 3rd parties.
If and to the extent we identify specific sets of event sequences consistent with
theories of the case, with the traces found in a reconstruction, and with the
traces found in the original writing, we can assert that the cause could have
produced the effect to the extent the methods we used were able to
differentiate, and through refutation, eliminate other possibilities while
potentially leaving still other possibilities not yet confirmed or refuted. That is
the limit of what we can do.
PRECISION, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction can rarely, if ever, produce exactly the same traces as the traces
in the original writing. Because most digital systems are quite complex, even
though many of their component parts are highly repeatable, timing, state
information, external context, and other similar phenomena produce different
traces for repetitions of the same experiment. It is impossible to perfectly
reproduce an experiment and thus repetition of experiments are not always
identical. The differences and similarities between experiments and their
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results have to be understood in the context of the matter at hand in order to
meaningfully reproduce events and understand results. This then comes down
to understanding the base rates of differences, at a minimum, in terms of
precision, accuracy, and reliability.
For example, to reproduce a Web access sequence to test the logs generated,
files altered, and technical metadata produced by the process, we might
reasonably perform a set of experiments in nearly identical conditions to see
what the variances are in results of the measured phenomena as reflected in
traces. Then we might vary parameters, such as system loads, time of day,
cache conditions, and so forth. But which we have to do might also depend on
the need to be accurate for a particular case, and the number of repetitions
depends on the statistical model in use and the related assumptions. Sampling
theory has to be applied to generate the answers to such questions, but only if
and to the extent that multiple samples are relevant to the issues at hand.
If you don't know what these things are, chances are you aren't qualified to
make decisions about whether and to what extent they are needed in order to
get the right answers. While you may not usually have to worry because the
experts and lawyers on the other side probably don't know what these things
are either, you should still concern yourself with them, because otherwise, you
could easily get the wrong answers. And isn't justice about getting at the truth
and digital forensics a path toward that end?
EDITORIAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Building a science surrounding digital forensics requires a methodology for
addressing experiments. The experimental branch of digital forensics is, in
large part, what we call reconstruction.
Reconstruction involves identifying and repeating event sequences that test
theories of the case in order to refute or confirm different theories based on
available evidence. This is done by comparing the traces produced in the
original writing to reconstructions of event sequences under different theories
of the case.
In order to draw conclusions about the results of reconstruction, it is necessary
to understand the issues of what constitutes a refutation and confirmation,
precision, accuracy, and reliability issues, and the supporting fields such as
relevant areas of statistics.
Disagree? Let us know! It's the only way we can grow.
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